Resumo Eleições regulares melhoram o desempenho da democracia em África? E qual o efeito das eleições nos padrões de competição pelo governo? Respondemos a estas questões através de duas análises empíricas que utilizam uma base de dados original com eleições realizadas em 17 países africanos desde as eleições fundadoras da era multipartidária até 2019. A primeira testa o efeito da alternância no governo no desempenho da democracia, e demonstra que enquanto a alternância no governo nas eleições fundadoras melhora o desempenho da democracia no futuro, a vitória da oposição em eleições subsequentes não produz ganhos democráticos. A segunda examina porquê alguns países experimentam maior alternância no governo e outros menos; e revela que a probabilidade de alternância ao longo do tempo é maior, quando também houve alternância nas eleições fundadoras do multipartidarismo e as eleições são mais competitivas e justas. Estes resultados contribuem para a literatura que associa eleições, democracia e alternância em África.

Abstract Does having more regular elections improve democratic performance in Africa? And have elections transformed the patterns of alternation in government? To answer these questions, two analyses are conducted drawing on an original dataset of 179 elections in 27 African countries, from the founding multiparty elections until 2019. The first tests the effects of alternation in government on democratic performance and shows that while alternation in government in the founding elections improves democratic performance, opposition victories in subsequent elections do not produce democratic gains. The second examines why alternation in government is more frequent in certain countries than in others; and reveals that the odds of turnover are increased by alternation in government in the founding elections, the level of political competition and the quality of elections. These findings contribute to literature linking elections, democracy and turnover in Africa.

In the literature analyzing democratization processes, a central discussion is that institutional arrangements and historical aspects have an influence on the chances of success. The main prescriptions in the literature point to certain arrangements, such as the combination of either Parlamentarianism, proportional representation, and bicameralism or that of Presidentialism and majority representation, as favoring the democratization process. Using the Boolean method, the article tests these hypotheses in the African context and reaches the conclusion that the main prescriptions in the literature are inadequate for analyzing democratization in Africa.

Dans la littérature qui analyse les processus de démocratisation, on relève l’importance de la discussion sur la nature des compromis institutionnels et des aspects historiques qui peuvent influencer leurs chances de succès. Les principales suggestions de cette littérature montrent certains compromis - la combinaison du parlementarisme avec la représentation proportionnelle et le système à deux Chambres, ou celle du présidentialisme avec la représentation majoritaire, par exemple - comme favorisant la démocratisation. À l’aide de la méthode booléenne, l’article cherche à appliquer ces hypothèses au contexte africain, et conclut que les principales suggestions de la littérature ne sont pas appropriées à l’analyse du phénomène de démocratisation en Afrique.